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Abstract 
The search for a tool to compel corporate accountability for human rights 
violations is longstanding. The adoption of the UN Human Rights Council 
Resolution on the elaboration of a binding instrument and the 
establishment of an intergovernmental working group represents the 
latest stage in the evolution of attempts to regulate multinational 
corporations. The move to develop a binding instrument on business and 
human rights is divisive. As such, it requires a thorough analysis, both of its 
proposed content but also of the outcome we could hope to achieve 
through such an instrument. This article analyses the proposed creation and 
content of a binding instrument as well as the conceptualisation and 
implementation of a binding instrument. 
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Resumo 
A busca por uma ferramenta para compelir a responsabilidade corporativa 
em violações de direitos humanos é antiga. A adoção da Resolução do 
Conselho de Direitos Humanos da ONU para elaboração de um instrumento 
vinculante e o estabelecimento de um grupo de trabalho 
intergovernamental representa o último estágio na evolução das tentativas 
de regular corporações multinacionais. O movimento no sentido de 
desenvolver um instrumento vinculante em direitos humanos e empresas é 
permeado de dissenso. Como tal, requer uma análise completa tanto de seu 
conteúdo proposto como do resultado que nós poderíamos esperar atingir 
com tal instrumento. Este artigo analisa a criação e o conteúdo propostos 
para um instrumento vinculante assim como sua conceituação e 
implantação. 
 
Palavras-chave  
Direitos humanos. Empresas. Princípios Orientadores das Nações Unidas 
em Empresas e Direitos Humanos. Corporações Multinacionais. 
 
Resumen 
La búsqueda por una herramienta para imponer la responsabilidad 
corporativa en violaciones de derechos humanos es antigua. La adopción de 
la Resolución del Consejo de Derechos Humanos de la ONU para 
elaboración de un instrumento vinculante y para el establecimiento de un 
grupo de trabajo intergubernamental representa la última etapa en la 
evolución de los intentos de regular corporaciones multinacionales. El 
movimiento en el sentido de desarrollar un instrumento vinculante en 
derechos humanos y empresas está repleto de disenso. Por eso, requiere 
un análisis completo tanto de su contenido propuesto, como del resultado 
que nosotros podríamos esperar atingir con tal instrumento. Este artículo 
analiza la creación y el contenido propuestos para un instrumento 
vinculante, así como su concepto e implementación. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The search for a tool to compel corporate accountability for human rights violations is 
longstanding. The adoption of the UN Human Rights Council Resolution on the elaboration of a 
binding instrument and the establishment of an intergovernmental working group (the working 
group)1 represents the latest stage in the evolution of attempts to regulate multinational 
corporations (MNCs). The move to develop a binding instrument on business and human rights is 
divisive. As such, it requires a thorough analysis, both of its proposed content but also of the outcome 
we could hope to achieve through such an instrument. 
In my analysis of the proposed creation of a binding instrument, I focus on three issues. The 
first relates to the context in which the discussion of a binding instrument occurs. Here I discuss: (i) 
the division between those who support the Guiding Principles2 and those who support a binding 
instrument; (ii) the importance of norm development in international human rights law and how the 
evolution of work on business and human rights at the UN level represents such a development; and 
(iii) the benefit of this process for MNCs who strive to achieve human rights standards. 
The second part is an analysis of the proposed content of a binding instrument. Here I discuss: 
(i) the selection of rights in the proposed binding instrument; (ii) the description of gross human rights 
violations versus the violation of structural poverty; and (iii) the importance of a gendered approach 
when drafting in a binding instrument. 
The third category is a discussion of the conceptualisation and implementation of a binding 
instrument. In this category I discuss: (i) the concepts of responsibility, duty and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR); (ii) the integration of human rights compliance into the entire corporate 
structure; and (iii) the scope of MNC’s human rights obligations with reference to free, prior and 
informed consent.  
2. THE CONTEXT OF A PROPOSED BINDING INSTRUMENT 
2.1  THE DIVISION:  GUIDING PRINCIPLES VERSUS A B INDING INSTRUMENT  
Currently there exists a perceived conceptual binary between the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (the GPs), on the one hand, and the pursuit of a binding instrument, on 
the other (SIXTO, 2015, p.3-4 and DAVITTI, 2016, p. 1-3 and BILCHITZ, 2015).3 I submit that a rigidly 
                                                                
1
 See resolution A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 “Elaboration of an internationally legally binding instrument on transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights” adopted by the UN Human Rights Council. Available 
at:  < https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G14/064/48/PDF/G1406448.pdf?OpenElement>. Accessed at 
11.10.2016 10h23., . 
2
 “The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights”. Available at: < 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf >. Accessed at 11.10.2016 10h30.. 
3
 See: master thesis of SIXTO, Olga F. “Business and Human Rights: A Study on the Implications of the Proposed Binding Treaty”. 
Available at: <https://www.business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Business%20and%20Human%20Rights.%20A%20study%20on%20the%20i
mplications%20of%20the%20proposed%20binding%20treaty.pdf>. Accessed at 11.10.2016 10h37;   DAVITTI Daria, ”Refining 
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fixed binary is both incorrect and destructive. The Guiding Principles, national action plans (NAPS) to 
implement such principles, and developments towards a binding instrument, are all part of a 
continuum of norm development that we have seen many times in international law (MEYERSFELD, 
2010, p.1-15).4  
The Guiding Principles created a formulation to achieve human rights compliance. That was, 
in the words of the Former Representative of the Secretary General on business and human rights, 
the end of the beginning and not the beginning of the end. Ruggie notes that the GPs  
by itself, will not bring business and human rights challenges to an end. But it will mark the 
end of the beginning: by establishing a common global platform for action, on which 
cumulative progress can be built, step-by-step, without foreclosing any other promising 
longer-term developments.5 
The next step is to galvanise governments to devise and implement NAPs to ensure that there 
is no immunity for corporate malfeasance. NAPs are in fact the perfect precursor to the adoption of 
a binding instrument. Almost all international human rights instruments require states to adjust their 
internal laws and policies to comply with the treaty in question. This is usually done through the 
creation of a national action plan to become compliant with the treaty. The NAPs process is in fact 
preparation for a binding instrument. Therefore, in terms of process, there is an important continuum 
of work from the adoption of the GPs, to the development of NAPs, to the adoption of a binding 
instrument. This continuum is one that will allow for the evolution of crisp, binding rules regarding 
business and human rights.  
In addition to the integrity of this continuing process, there are important substantive 
principles regarding the development and specification of norms in international human rights law. 
2.2  NORM DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN R IGHTS LAW  
One of the questions that arises in the debate about a binding instrument is whether 
international law needs to be developed at all to address the harm caused by some multinational 
corporations. The answer is yes. We are all acutely aware of the “governance gaps” caused, in part, by 
the income inequality between the so-called Global North and Global South.6 And while the Guiding 
Principles impose obligations on all states to protect against corporate abuses, this injunction does 
not take into account the reality of certain developing states’ need to attract foreign direct 
investment by keeping their labour costs low and their regulatory systems weak.7 This creates a gap 
                                                                
the Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework for Business and Human Rights and its Guiding Principles”, Human Rights Law 
Review (2016): 1–21; and BILCHITZ David, ”The Moral and Legal Necessity for a Business and Human Rights Treaty”. Available 
at: < https://business-humanrights.org/en/treaty-on-business-human-rights-necessary-to-fill-gaps-in-intl-law-says-academic >. 
Accessed 11.10.2016 10h44.  
4
 For a discussion of the principle of a norm development see MEYERSFELD Bonita, Domestic Violence and International Law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010). 
5
 Report A/HRC/17/31, “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect 
and Remedy” Framework: Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie”, para 13. Available at: < 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/A-HRC-17-31_AEV.pdf>.  Accessed at 10.11.2016 11h17. 
6
 Ibid.  
7
 MEYERSFELD, Bonita, “Institutional Investment and the Protection of Human Rights: A Regional Proposal” in Globalisation 
and Governance, ed. Laurance Boulle (South Africa: SyberInk, 2011), 174.   
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– the cause of which may be the subject of much debate – but the result of which is that hundreds of 
thousands of people experience human rights violations, where corporations are liable or complicit, 
with no access to justice.8 Given this global economic dissonance, it is fictional to rely purely on 
national legal systems to regulate transnational corporate activity. The development of international 
law is necessary if we are serious about attenuating human rights violations that remain unaddressed 
because of this gap. 
The fact is that international law is indeed responding to this need: there is evidence of a 
norm developing in international law that corporations are subjects of international human rights law. 
We are in the midst of the amorphous process of norm-crystallization (MEYERSFELD, 2010, p. 107).9 
The more precise, certain and authoritative international law becomes, the easier it will be to 
attenuate human rights violations caused by, or associated with, multinational corporations in the 
Global South. 
In particular, we are witnessing a process of specification or norm development. International 
law is evolving towards a precise right to be free from corporate-linked human rights violations, with 
all its nuances, and the precise concomitant corporate obligation to help remedy such violations, with 
all its nuances. The evolution of this norm can be traced back to 1945, when corporate complicity in 
human rights violations first entered the discourse of international law through the Nuremberg 
Tribunals.10 
There is precedent for such norm development and specification in international law. A key 
example is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW).11 For decades prior to the adoption of this convention, the international community 
resisted the development of a women’s convention on the basis that the existing international human 
rights framework was sufficiently generic to ensure the protection of women’s rights (MEYERSFELD, 
2010, p.144).12 Through the development of reasoned principles and arguments, the international 
community finally agreed that the human rights violations experienced by women at the hands of 
both state and non-state actors, was similar to – but also different from – the experience of men. There 
was thus a need for the specification of such violations, with the concomitant identification of specific 
and proportionate remediation.13 This resulted in CEDAW. CEDAW was a distillation of general 
                                                                
8
 Ibid. 
9
 For a discussion of this process in respect of domestic violence and international law, see Meyersfeld Domestic Violence in 
International Law, note 4 above.  
10
 See Article 9 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and 
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis ("London Agreement"), 8 August 1945 (“Nuremberg Charter”), 
which states that the Tribunal may declare a group or organisation a criminal organisation. Available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b39614.html>. Accessed 11.10.2016 12h07.  For a discussion of this see STOICHKOVA 
Desislava,, Towards Corporate Liability in International Criminal Law (Belgium: Intersentia,2010), 47 – 49; RAMASASTRY Anita 
”Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon: An Examination of Forced Labour Cases and their Impact on the Liability 
of Multinational Corporation,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 20 (2002): 91; and ONGESO John P. “Corporate Criminal 
Liability in International Law: Nuremberg and the International Criminal Court,” in An exploration of corporate criminal liability 
in international law for aiding and abetting international crimes in Africa  chapter 3 .Available at: 
<http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/handle/10539/19482>. Accessed at 11.10.2016 13h53. 
11
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women UNTS 1249 (1979):13. Available at: 
<http://www.hrcr.org/docs/CEDAW/cedaw.html>. Accessed at 11.10.2016 15h53. 
12
 Meyersfeld Domestic Violence in International Law, note 4 above, 144. 
13
 MEYERSFELD, Bonita, “Business, Human Rights and Gender: A Legal Approach to External and Internal Considerations” in 
Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect?, eds. Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 194.   
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international law principles relating to equality.14 It recreated and refined the principle of equality 
with reference to the specific harms endured by women.  
Another example of norm development and the importance of norm specification in 
international law is the category of rules relating to the prohibition on trafficking (MEYERSFELD, 
2010, p.144).15 There are over 14 international instruments on trafficking. The history of the 
development of this issue in international law is informative in the context of developing 
international law relating to multinational corporations. In 1904, the League of Nations adopted the 
International Agreement for the Suppression of the ‘White Slave Traffic.’16 This was followed in 1910 
by the International Convention for the Suppression of the ‘White Slave Traffic.’17 In 1927, the Slavery 
Convention obliged states to prevent and suppress the slave trade, which included forced labour.18 
This was entrenched in 1930 by the Forced Labour Convention regarding the use of forced or 
compulsory labour in all its forms.19 In 1934, the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Traffic in Women of Full Age introduced the obligation to punish: 
Whoever, in order to gratify the passions of another person, has procured, enticed or led 
away even with her consent, a woman or girl of full age for immoral purposes to be carried 
out in another country…, notwithstanding that the various acts constituting the offence 
may have been committed in different countries.20  
Almost 20 years later in 1951, the International Convention for the Suppression of the ‘White 
Slave Traffic’ was updated, expanding on the obligations of states vis-à-vis various acts that constitute 
trafficking.21 In 1957 the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery was adopted to ”intensify national as well as international 
efforts” towards the abolition of slavery and the slave trade.22 Although trafficking as a phrase was 
not included in this Convention, the list of prohibited acts includes practices which amount to 
trafficking.23  
                                                                
14
 CEDAW preamble; see also Meyersfeld Domestic Violence in International Law, note 4 above, 144. 
15
 Meyersfeld Domestic Violence in International Law, note 4 above, 144. 
16
 International Agreement for the Suppression of the ‘White Slave Traffic,’ LNTS 1 (1904): 83. Available at: 
<http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/whiteslavetraffic1904.html>. Accessed at 11.10.2016 15h54. 
17
 Ibid as amended by Protocol Amending the International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, and 
Amending the International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic UNTS 30 (1949): 23. Available 
at:<http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/whiteslavetraffic1910.html>. Accessed at 11.10.2016 15h56. 
18
 Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Similar Institutions and Practices Convention of 1926 (Slavery Convention of 1926) 
LNTS 60 (1926): 253; Protocol amending the Slavery Convention UNTS 182 (1953): 51. Available at: 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/f1sc.htm. Accessed at 11.10.2016 15h57. 
19
 Forced Labour Convention: Convention (No. 29) Concerning Forced Labour   UNTS 39 (1930): 55. Available at: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ForcedLabourConvention.aspx>. Accessed 11.10.2016 15h58. 
20
 Article 1 of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age LNTS CL (1933): 431. 
Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/1933_international_convention_en_1.pdf>. 
Accessed at 11.10.2016 15h59. 
21
 Protocol Amending the International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, and Amending the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic UNTS 30 (1949):23. Available at: 
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2030/v30.pdf>. Accessed at 11.10.2016 16h01. 
22
 Preamble to the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices 
Similar to Slavery UNTS 266 (1956): 3. Available at: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/SupplementaryConventionAbolitionOfSlavery.aspx>. Accessed at 
11.10.2016 14h02.  
23
 Ibid article 7(c).  
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Over a decade later, in 1979, states agreed that trafficking of women is a human rights 
violation. Trafficking was included in article 6 of CEDAW, which obliges state parties to take all 
appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women. Still further, in 
1990, article 35 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child specifically obliged states to take all 
appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent the trafficking of children.24 The 
following year in 2000 the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale 
of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography was adopted, which detailed states’ obligations 
to prevent and protect against trafficking in children specifically.25  
In the same year the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons 
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, was adopted.26 This Convention aims specifically at the prevention of trafficking, 
particular in respect of women and children.27 The Convention addresses the nuances that make 
trafficking a discrete form of slavery and recognising that the existing international instruments 
against slavery in general did not reflect the reality of this particular rights abuse. The Convention’s 
definition of trafficking includes ”the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of 
persons” not only by force, but also as a result of 
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over 
another person, for the purpose of exploitation.28  
It is also very specific about states’ obligations, which include the criminalisation of the 
participation in trafficking and the organisation or direction of others who commit this offence.29 
We can conclude that the increasing specification and detailed prohibition of certain types of 
human rights violation has occurred in international law. Therefore, we are at a moment where there 
is a need to develop specific and proportionate international law principles regarding the 
accountability of corporations and, specifically, MNCs. This is necessary because the harm permeates 
borders, allowing transnational companies to escape liability while retaining profits – and this is one 
of our greatest global crises. 
2.3  BENEFITS FOR MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS  
The response to this harm, which affects people in the Global South disproportionately, 
cannot simply be one of voluntarism and encouragement. We need to move towards a system that is 
                                                                
24
 Convention on the Rights of the Child UNTS 1577 (1990): 3. Available at: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx>. Accessed at 11.10.2016 16h04. 
25
 Resolution A/RES/54/263 “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution and Child Pornography” adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.  Available at 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38bc.html>. Accessed at 11.10.2016 15h13. 
26
 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime UNTS 2237 (2003):319. ([hereinafter the Palermo Protocol). 
Available at: <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/mtdsg/volume%20ii/chapter%20xviii/xviii-12-a.en.pdf>. Accessed at 
11.10.2016 16h07. 
27
 Ibid at article 2. 
28
 Ibid at article 3(a). 
29
 Ibid at article 5(2). 
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responsive to the power wielded by MNCs. At a minimum, we need to acknowledge that the focus of 
international human rights law is not on who is bound but on who is protected. As a result, at a 
minimum this process must consider the role of the following repositories of power in causing harm: 
(i) home states with corporations operating abroad (described by De Schutter as parent based 
extraterritorial obligations) (DE SCHUTTER, 2016, p.47);30 (ii) host states which host the operations of 
MNCs; and (iii) MNCs operating outside the jurisdiction of their home state. 
How the working group decides to approach the legal regulation of these repositories of 
power will be the substance of debate for the next several years. But the project of a binding 
instrument must address the power all three repositories of power that contribute to a lack of 
corporate accountability for human rights violations, particularly focusing on the role of powerful 
MNCs in exploiting governments of weak economies (MEYERSFELD, 2011, p.174).31  
Apart from the need to address governance gaps and the consequent human rights violations, 
it is also important to note that a binding instrument has the potential to benefit corporations and 
other business entities that do comply with human rights standards; that do advance social and 
economic wellbeing in their business operations wherever they may be operating; and that do address 
violations when they occur with the rigour that justice requires.  
Such corporations may be undermined and undercut by deviant corporations whose 
operations are cheaper and harmful. This is anti-competitive and places “good corporate citizens” at 
a disadvantage in the global marketplace. A binding instrument will create a level playing field where 
human rights compliant corporations are not at a competitive disadvantage. This is in contrast to the 
current status quo where the responsibility to respect may be abrogated unfairly by non-compliant 
MNCs, most often with no consequence..  
3. THE CONTENT OF A PROPOSED BINDING INSTRUMENT 
3.1  ALL RIGHTS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE B INDING INSTRUMENT  
Is a corporation’s raison d’être to advance human rights or is its mandate a much narrower 
concept of not violating human rights? This is the question regarding the identity and function of 
MNCs: are they solely creatures of profit or do they have a social development mandate?  
The profit and wealth generated by many MNCs, comes with significant political and 
governmental power. Is this power the equivalent of state power in practice and, if that is the case, 
should the power trigger state-like obligations? In reality, most modern day MNCs probably self-
identify as a hybrid entity, working both as a profit-making entity, and also to developing communities 
affected by their operations (MEYERSFELD).32 
Bearing in mind this hybridity, what human rights should fall within the realm of a MNC’s 
mandate and what rights should be included in a binding instrument? I propose that a binding 
instrument should not be limited to a closed list of rights. As is clear from the language in the GPs of 
                                                                
30
 DE SCHUTTER, Olivier, “Towards a New Treaty on Business and Human Rights,” Business and Human Rights Journal 1 (2016):  
47. 
31
 MEYERSFELD, “Institutional Investment and the Protection of Human Rights, note 8 above, 174. 
32
 For a discussion of such undertakings in the mining sector, see MEYERSFELD, Bonita, “Empty Promises and the Myth of 
Mining: Does Mining Lead to Pro-Poor Development?” Business and Human Rights Journal, forthcoming. 
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“human rights abuses”, all rights should be included in the conceptualisation of duties or 
responsibilities of MNCs.33 But this does not mean that all multinational and transnational 
corporations should be bound to fulfil all rights. It would be an impossible task to list all the possible 
rights for which different corporate entities could be responsible. One therefore needs a test that 
reasonably links the right in question to the corporation in question. 
I propose a two-part test that echoes some of the principles under Pillar Two of the GPs. First, 
where a MNC causes a violation, or if a MNC benefits directly from a violation, irrespective of the right 
being violated, that corporation should be responsible for that violation. This is a retrospective and 
remedial test and mostly not contentious, echoing the “do no harm” principle in the GPs.34 The second 
part of the test asks whether the operations of a MNC, operating in a particular industry, should 
advance human rights. If the operations of an MNC are likely to affect a particular set of rights, 
arguably the corporation will have a responsibility to ensure the protection and fulfilment of such 
rights. This is a prospective test and asks what rights a corporate entity may affect. Perhaps even 
more contentious, is the question whether the corporate responsibility / duty includes an obligation 
to enhance a set of rights. One argument is that this is the responsibility of a government and not 
corporate actors. However, corporations have a degree of power and resources that often exceed 
those of governments. It is therefore appropriate that the role of corporations in advancing human 
rights be consistent both with their power and with their impact. 
In what circumstances, however, should a corporation be responsible for the advancement of 
human rights? There is precedent for this test in the South African Constitution, which has a Bill of 
Rights that binds the state vis-a-vis its citizens (vertical application), and that binds individuals, 
including juristic persons, vis-a-vis other persons (horizontal application).35 The Bill of Rights “binds a 
natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the 
right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.” To determine whether a right is applicable to a 
juristic person, such as a corporation, one must ask two questions: (i) What is the nature of the right; 
and (ii) What is the nature of any duty imposed by that right. One does not ask: who is responsible for 
the right but rather: what duty does that right demand in order for it to be enjoyed. The entity able 
to affect that right is the entity with the power to affect its fulfilment. This analysis is appropriately 
silent about the agent responsible for the right; human rights are not about the agent responsible for 
their fulfilment but about the individual whose rights must be fulfilled. 
3.2  THE NOTION OF POVERTY  AS A GROSS HUMAN R IGHTS VIOLATIONS  
Any instrument regulating cross border corporate conduct should not be limited to gross 
human rights violations. So-called ”gross human rights violations” generally refer to extreme harm 
(such as torture, genocide or crimes against humanity), perpetrated by state actors in conflict 
situations. It is not often that corporations are proved to have links to such harms. The true, everyday 
                                                                
33
 Note 5 above, 3. 
34
 Ibid, 13. 
35
 Section 8(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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harm caused by corporate malfeasance is the exploitation or causation of the extremely dangerous, 
and at times lethal, structure of poverty (SOUBBOTINA with SHERAM, 2000, p.32).36  
Poverty is a gross human rights violation, sharing many of the constitutive elements of the 
category of ”gross rights violation”. Poverty is often dismissed as an economic structure and not a 
human rights violation. At the same time, common experiences of poverty are individually considered 
a human rights violation. For example, not having access to food is a human rights violation; not 
having access to water is a human rights violation; not having access to health or housing or justice – 
these are all human rights violations. If we put them together as a cumulative, this is called “poverty” 
but is seen as something that is the responsibility either poor governance or the choice of “lazy” and 
”deficient” poor people. Poverty is the collection of all the aforementioned rights, and many more. 
As such, it is a severe human rights violation and corporate entities should ensure that they neither 
exacerbate nor benefit from sustaining levels of poverty. Pogge explores this concept in the mining 
sector, noting that: 
Even if there is nothing wrong with employing, on extremely ungenerous terms, someone 
who has other reasonable options, it may be seriously wrong to employ someone who, 
because of his religion or skin color, cannot find another job. By paying such a person half 
of what persons of different faith or color get paid… the corporation would be taking 
advantage of an injustice (POGGE, 2003, p.6-7).37 
The link between MNCs and the structural nature of poverty cannot be ignored. Of course 
government has a significant role in alleviating poverty (MUROMBO, 2013, p.31).38 However, the role 
of government often eclipses the obligations of corporations; the obligations of MNCs therefore 
need to be emphasised.39 In addition, the need for developing economies to attract foreign direct 
investment usually results in government conduct that may not be in the best interests of 
impoverished communities (MEYERSFELD, 2011, p.174).40 Corporations often exploit the need for 
foreign investment and the consequent unequal power relations that ensue. A classic example of this 
is the accession of developing states to stabilisation clauses, which immunise the investing 
corporation from any changes in local laws that might have an economic impact on the project in 
question (SORELL, 2008, p.2).41 The government, therefore, is not always the supposed free agent, 
able to use corporate investment to break cycles of poverty. So while government agents are 
                                                                
36 SOUBBOTINA, Tatyana P. with SHERAM, Katherine A., ”Beyond Economic Growth Meeting the Challenges of Global 
Development” WBI Learning Resources Series. Available at: 
<http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/beyond/beyondco/beg_all.pdf>. Accessed at 11.10.2016 15h29. 
37
 POGGE, Thomas W, ”Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation,” UNESCO Poverty Project on Ethical and Human Rights 
Dimensions of Poverty: Towards a New Paradigm in the Fights against Poverty, Philosophy Seminar at All Souls College - Oxford 
(March 2003). Available at: 
<http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/files/4363/10980840881Pogge_29_August.pdf/Pogge+29+August.pdf>. Accessed at 
11.10.2016 15h33.  
38
 MUROMBO, Tumai, “Regulating Mining in South Africa and Zimbabwe: Communities, the Environment and Perpetual 
Exploitation” Law, Environment and Development Journal 9/1 (2013):31. 
39
 See, for example, ”Lonmin Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 30 September 2012". Available at: 
<https://www.lonmin.com/annual_report_2012/introduction/events_at_marikana.html>. Accessed at 21.07.2016.  
40
 Note 31 above. 
41
 SORELL, Tom, ”Project Financing in Developing Countries, New Corporate Social Responsibility, Human Rights, and 
Multinational Corporations” (2008) 5 Essex Human Rights Review 5/1 (2008): 2. 
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absolutely part of the problem of failed development projects (HAMANN, 2004, p.278),42 the “blame 
game” should not eclipse the role of corporate actors. 
A binding instrument must speak to the reality of poverty and the fact that almost all 
incidents of MNC-linked human rights abuses take place in impoverished contexts. A binding 
instrument must also be mindful of the fact that poverty itself is a human rights violation and 
construct reasonable obligations on corporations not to benefit from the cruelty linked to poverty, 
with a corresponding obligation on states not to allow such exploitation.   
A binding instrument may address poverty in several ways. It should: (i) expressly denounce 
poverty as a ”gross human rights violation” (although that term itself may be problematic); (ii) include 
practical provisions requiring corporations and states not to exploit contexts of poverty; (iii) provide 
for mechanisms to address the human rights violations caused by wages that do not constitute a living 
wage, irrespective of national minimum wage legislation;43 and (iv) create obligations regarding post-
operation activity that must leave affected communities in better socio-economic conditions than 
existed before the corporate activities began.   
In order to understand the cycle of poverty and the way in which corporate conduct can 
meaningfully – and profitably – contribute to interrupting the cycle of poverty, one needs to be 
inclusive of the most marginalised and impoverished people.  I therefore suggest that in-country 
consultations be held on the content, scope and nature of a binding instrument, especially with those 
adversely affected by transnational corporate activity.  
3.3  A GENDERED APPROACH TO THE DRAFTING OF A B INDING INSTRUMENT  
Gender refers to the norms and roles that are socially and culturally ascribed to people based 
on their sex. The impact of these ascribed roles and norms are differentiating and discriminatory: 
operations that appear facially neutral may have a negative and disproportionate impact on women. 
To ameliorate this problem, I propose that the content and scope of a binding instrument 
should be developed from a gendered perspective. This does not mean that it must be written by or 
for women alone. Rather, it should not assume that there is one homogenous victim of human rights 
violations or that all human rights violations are experienced in the same way. Women – and other 
units within social structures – will experience human rights violations in the same way as – and in 
different ways from – men.  
A gendered perspective would allow corporations and the authorities that regulate them to 
pry open layers of assumptions about human rights violations and how they are experienced, creating 
a basis for better, directed and proportionate corresponding obligations.  
4. THE CONCEPTUALISATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A PROPOSED 
BINDING INSTRUMENT 
                                                                
42
 See for example the analysis by HAMANN, Ralph, “Corporate Social Responsibility, Partnerships and Institutional Change: 
The Case of Mining Companies in South Africa” Natural Resources Forum 28 (2004):278. 
43
 A living wage is understood as the minimum amount of money needed to maintain a standard of living. For a discussion of a 
living wage and what that standard is see ANKER, Richard, ”Estimating a living wage: A methodological review”) International 
Labor Organization (2011). Available at: 
<http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_protect/@protrav/@travail/documents/publication/wcms_162117.pdf>. 
Accessed at 11.10.2016 11h53. 
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4.1  LANGUAGE:  RESPONSIBILITY ,  DUTY AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY  
At the heart of the GPs is a distinction between the notion of “duty”, as applicable to states, 
and ”responsibility”, as applicable to corporations. Quite apart from the distinction drawn in the GPs, 
the language of ”responsibility”, particularly in the context of corporate social responsibility (CSR), in 
many ways acts as a vehicle that distorts and collapses two distinct issues, namely charity versus law. 
This conflation is erroneous for several reasons. 
First, CSR (also known as corporate social investment or CSI) involves voluntary, selective 
projects, which are usually charitable in nature. These projects tend to focus on specific subject 
matters, such as the construction of schools, hospitals or contributions to another type of charitable 
project. This is distinct from compliance with international human rights law, which impose generic, 
wide ranging obligations to avoid violating any human right and, arguably, to advance human rights, 
especially where such is an explicit undertaking by corporations. International human rights law does 
not allow for the type of rights-selection that characterises CSR. 
Second, CSR is voluntary and is not a principle of law. If we are serious about fundamental 
rights protection, then a ”pick and choose” approach to specific charitable projects means that a 
corporation may simultaneously commit human rights violations by, for example, forced 
displacement, while undertaking a disproportionately small (and usually very public) charitable, once 
off project, such as building a school. While the latter is obviously welcome, a true contribution would 
be to build, staff and fund a school, in addition to ensuring that displacement does not violate other 
rights, such as the right to housing or access to water.  
Therefore, there is often a disjuncture between the CSR statements of MNC and such 
corporations’ impact on human rights, especially in respect of socio-economic rights and local 
economic development. The result is that there is no way of monitoring compliance with the 
articulated CSR projects. 
This is not to denounce completely CSR policies, which have become an important and 
growing practice by most corporations. However, it should not be conflated with compliance in 
general with human rights standards. 
4.2  INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS INTO T HE ENTIRE CORPORATE 
STRUCTURE  
Going beyond CSR demands the practical integration of all human rights standards into the 
entire structure of a MNC. Meaningful human rights compliance can only occur if the entire corporate 
structure, including subsidiaries, supply chains and franchises, are all subject to stringent human 
rights standards – implemented from the “top tables” of orporations, irrespective of a distinction 
between a corporation and its subsidiaries and irrespective of geography. 
In practice this may mean appointing human rights specialists who have the same power and 
input into investment and project selection as actuaries, economists, risk specialists, commercial 
lawyers and, most importantly, key decisions makers. 
But we still need to be specific about enhancing human rights compliance by articulating 
specific practices, to which I now turn. I cannot stress enough the importance of delineating clear and 
precise content to the methodology by which corporations should comply with human rights 
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standards. In order to understand practically what a corporation’s obligations may entail, the question 
of prevention, mitigation and remediation should be approached in two parts. 
First, how should a corporation ensure that its internal operations comply with international 
human rights law i.e. how it treats its employees, contractors and supply chains? Second, how should 
a corporation ensure that its operations externally comply with international human rights law, i.e. 
how it treats affected communities and sub-units within such communities, the health and wellbeing 
of those exposed to its operations, consumer protection, environmental considerations and other 
consequences of their corporate conduct? 
In many ways, the internal considerations are clearly defined and conceptualised in the body 
of international labour law and relate, amongst others, to trade unionism, pay equity, wages, working 
conditions and child labour. In my view the more difficult challenge is to give specific content to, and 
consequences for non-accountability with, MNCs’ external human rights obligations.  
We have an excellent starting point in the GPs, including the due diligence process articulated 
under pillar two. The problem we continue to face, however, is testing the extent to, which (i) a 
corporation undertook a thorough investigation into how its operations may compromise human 
rights and (ii) if its due diligence reveals the potential for harm, whether this would result in a decision 
not to proceed with the project in question. 
4.3  FREE PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT  
We see this dilemma arise clearly in the framework of “free, prior and informed consent” or 
FPIC. In discussing FPIC, I will use the example of large-scale infrastructure development and 
consultation with affected communities (although it should be noted that the principles I articulate 
could – and should – be applicable irrespective of the industry, including food production and land 
grabs).  
The concept of FPIC suffers from several flaws in implementation. These flaws include: (i) the 
timing of consultation; (ii) the methodology of consultation; and (iii) the objective of consulting versus 
obtaining consent, the latter suggesting that a community can refuse the project in question.  
As regards the timing, community engagement may occur at different times throughout the 
lifespan of a corporate project. It is seldom, however, that such consultation takes place before there 
has been an institutional decision by the company that the project in question will be both lucrative 
and feasible. The company, therefore, has made an in-principle decision to proceed. It is rare that such 
a decision will change as a result of community consultation. So consultation takes place at a point on 
a timeline of a project where the most powerful players may have made a decision to progress – this 
is neither consultation nor the pursuit of consent. 
As regards the methodology of consultation, there are three problems. It is unlikely that a 
company will honestly give the full gamut of information about the project to the affected 
communities. In addition, there is serious critique of the extent to which FPIC excludes “marginalised” 
sub-groups within a community (OWEN and KEMP, 2013, p. 30). 44 This is not a new concern, especially 
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 OWEN, John R. and KEMP, Deanna, “Social License and Mining: A Critical Perspective” Resources Policy 38 (2013): 30. The 
Centre for Applied Legal Studies has developed a set of standard practices of respect and interaction to guide lawyers 
engaging with, inter alia, mine affected communities, see the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS), ”Community 
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in respect of gendered considerations and the extent to which consultation with community leaders 
may or may not harness the full set of considerations that affected communities may have. Finally, 
delinquent corporations may take a “box-ticking” approach to consultation, taking a tokenism 
approach to such engagement. So the methodology used in FPIC is to have a superficial engagement 
with some representatives of affected communities, based on information given to affected groups 
that is selective and incomplete. Such information asymmetry makes it nigh impossible for a 
community to make an informed decision, even if such were to be taken seriously.  
So how should a corporation address these deficiencies? If a MNC is serious about its 
commitment to social and economic development there is no justifiable reason why it should not 
facilitate legal representation on behalf of affected communities.  
Most importantly, multinational corporations should take the views – and decisions – of the 
affected community seriously in its proposed operations. This is in keeping with corporate language 
of a ”social license” to operate and ensures that decisions about development are made in partnership 
with affected communities; not before consulting with the affected communities.  
A true commitment to, respect for, and collegial, professional engagement with, affected 
communities would be premised on a commitment to an equal relationship. It is only through an equal 
and equivalent bargaining relationship, which itself is preconditioned on symmetrical levels of 
knowledge and information, that meaningful bargaining can occur. Anything less is a form of 
exploitation and contestation, making the promise of partnering with local communities a myth and 
not reality. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The steps following the GPs, whether they be national action plans and/or a binding 
instrument, should be responsive to the discussed considerations. To be effective, actually respond 
to, and stop human rights violations, a binding instrument must specifically take into account the 
context of international law’s approach to corporate accountability; the proposed content of such an 
instrument; and the specificity of its implementation. And it must do so in haste. Human rights 
violations linked to corporate activity continue daily. The “be patient” mantra is no longer a justifiable 
reason to allow the structure of poverty to grind away, generating profits for some and causing 
severe human rights violations for others.  
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